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Salt Lake City Corporation (hereinafter "Salt Lake City" or 
"Respondent"), respectfully submits this brief in response to Appellant's, 
Ronald L. Ingram (hereinafter "Ingram" or "Appellant"), appeal of the August 
21, 1985, decision of Third Judicial District Court, rendered by the Honorable 
Homer L. Wilkinson, granting Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Inasmuch as Ingram has failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(4), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, Salt Lake City shall set forth the issues it believes 
should be addressed by the Court. 
1 . Is Ingram precluded from now raising the issue of whether Salt 
Lake City's inspection and supervision of the construction work performed on 
the Sugarhouse Beautiffcation Project and, in connection therewith, on a 
certain vault cover constitute an "exercise of governmental function" under 
the Governmental Immunity Act because he failed to raise said issue in the 
Court below? 
2. If Ingram is not precluded from raising the above-mentioned matter, 
were the activities of Salt Lake City in arranging for, supervising and 
inspecting the construction of a vault or manhole cover in connection with the 
raising of the grade of the road and sidewalk surrounding said cover as part 
of an area-wide beautification project an exercise of governmental function? 
3. If Ingram's alleged injuries arose out of the exercise of a 
governmental function, is immunity from Ingram's claim waived by any 
applicable provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
4. Was summary judgment appropriate in the instant case? 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 21, 1985, the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding, granted Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dismissing Ingram's complaint as to Salt Lake City Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On or about December 14, 1984, Ingram filed a Complaint against 
Ford Motor Company, Salt Lake City and Okland Construction Company 
(hereinafter "Okland Construction") alleging that the foregoing defendants in 
some manner negligently caused injuries to him. Record at 2-6 (Complaint 
attached hereto as Addendum "A") . 
2. Thereafter, on or about January 14, 1985, Okland Construction and 
Salt Lake City filed motions for severance of the action against Ford Motor 
Company, for summary judgment on the pleadings and for the dismissal of 
claims for punitive damages. Record at 21-22 and 25-34. After a hearing on 
said motions, the Court granted the motion to severe Ingram's action against 
Ford Motor Company. Record at 47-49. 
3. On or about May 24, 1985, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Salt Lake City brought a Motion for Summary Judgment, supported 
by the Affidavit of Parviz Rokhva and a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, moving the Court to dismiss Salt Lake City as a defendant in 
said action under the Utah Governmental Immunities Act. Record at 66, 75-78 
and 70-74 (said Motion, Affidavit and Memorandum is attached hereto as 
Addendum "B," "C" and "D," respectively). 
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4. In response to said Motion, Ingram filed a counter-motion for 
summary judgment submitting a number of affidavits regarding the alleged 
defective construction and installation of the vault cover. Record at 84, 
88-89, 85-86, 109-110 and 119-120. 
5. In opposition to Ingram's Counter Motion, Salt Lake City submitted 
the Affidavit of Frederick L. Strasser. Record at 96-99 (attached hereto as 
Addendum "E"). 
6. Salt Lake City's motion was granted on August 21, 1985, by the 
Third Judicial District Court Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, from which the 
instant appeal is taken. Record at 149-50 (Order attached hereto as 
Addendum "F") . 
7. Ingram's action against Okland Construction proceeded to trial and 
a verdict of no cause of action was rendered by the jury on October 8, 1985, 
and was filed and entered by the Clerk of the Court on October 9, 1985. 
8. The instant appeal was filed on or about November 5, 1985, 
disputing the District Court's order dismissing Ingram's action as to 
Salt Lake City. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Salt Lake City contracted with Okland Construction, for 
construction of the Sugarhouse Beautification Project (hereinafter 
"Beautification Project" or "Project"). Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C"). 
Construction on the Project began on or about March 5, 1984, and was 
substantially completed by December 5, 1985. Record at 75-78 (Addendum 
"C") . 
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2. The Beautification Project was initiated to renovate and restore the 
Sugarhouse business district. Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C"). 
3. In connection with the Beautification Project, the grade of the road 
known as 2100 South was raised. Record at 75-78 (Addendum n C") . 
4. Additionally, a vault cover or manhole cover, located on the north 
side of 2100 South, between the sidewalk and the curb and gutter at 1019 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah, was also raised to the grade of the sidewalk. 
Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . 
5. The construction for the vault hole and cover was completed in 
mid-August 1984. Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . 
6. On or about October 17, 1985, Ingram allegedly stepped on the 
edge of a manhole or vault cover which gave way, causing Ingram to fall into 
a vault or manhole. Record at 2-6 (Addendum "A"). 
7. Thereafter, on or about December 14, 1984, Ingram filed a 
complaint against Ford Motor Company, Salt Lake City and Okland 
Construction, who, under a contract with Salt Lake City, installed said 
manhole cover and vault. Record at 2-6 (Addendum "A") . Ingram alleged 
that the negligence of said defendants was the proximate cause of his alleged 
injuries. Record at 2-6 (Addendum "A"). 
8. On or about May 24, 1985, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Salt Lake City brought a Motion for Summary Judgment, moving 
the Court to dismiss Salt Lake City as a defendant in said action under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act supported by the Affidavit of Parviz 
Rokhva. Record at 66, 75-78 and 70-74. 
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9. In response to said Motion, Ingram filed a Counter-Motion for 
Summary Judgment submitting the Affidavits of Kay R. Orverson, Michael 
McRae, L. A. Dever and Floyd Campbell, regarding the alleged defective 
construction and installation of the vault cover. Record at 84, 88-89, 85-86, 
109-110 and 119-120, 
10. In opposition to Ingram's Counter Motion, Salt Lake City submitted 
the Affidavit of Frederick L. Strasser. Record at 96-99. 
11. A hearing was held on said motions and based upon the written 
material submitted and the oral argument of counsel, judgment was granted in 
favor of Salt Lake City and against Ingram on August 21, 1985, by Third 
Judicial District Court Judge Homer F. Wilkinson. Record at 149-50. 
12. Ingram's action against Okland Construction proceeded to trial and 
a verdict of no cause of action was rendered by the jury on October 8, 1985. 
13. Ingram filed a Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement, 
contending that the Third Judicial District Court's Order dismissing the action 
against Salt Lake City under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was in 
error. See, Docketing Statement (hereinafter referred to as Addendum "G"). 
14. Ingram, in the instant appeal, has subsequently filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Counsel, which was withdrawn and a Motion for Summary 
Disposition which was denied by the Court herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In Argument I , Salt Lake City seeks to have Ingram's appeal dismissed 
because Ingram in his Docketing Statement set forth an issue not raised in 
the proceedings below and now has abandoned the aforementioned issue 
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without framing any other issue in his appellate brief in violation of the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, More significantly, in Point II of his argument he 
attempts to raise issues outside of the record, which are now waived. 
Accordingly, in light of Ingram's past and continued violations this Court's 
rules and the principles of appellate review, Salt Lake City requests that the 
instant appeal be dismissed. 
In Argument I I , Salt Lake City will demonstrate that in initiating and 
contracting for the renovation of the Sugarhouse business district, and in 
connection therewith, contracting for the construction and installation of a 
vault cover or manhole at issue here, it was engaged in the "exercise of a 
governmental function." Therefore, any alleged injuries Ingram claims arose 
out of those activities are barred by the Utah Governmental Immunities Act, 
inasmuch as there is no applicable waiver of said immunity under the 
circumstances of this case. 
Finally, in Argument 111, Salt Lake City will establish that the District 
Court's disposition on summary judgment of Ingram's action was proper 
because as Ingram failed to put forth any evidence that Salt Lake City was 
negligent in inspecting said vault cover. 
ARGUMENT J_ 
INGRAM'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE INGRAM 
FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE HE ASSERTS IN HIS DOCKETING 
STATEMENT IN THE COURT BELOW AND BECAUSE HE HAS FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Since the date Ingram initiated his action against Salt Lake City and 
Okland Construction, Ingram has been aware of all the facts and 
circumstances on which he bases the instant appeal. Ingram, however, never 
62h 
raised, by way of pleading or at the hearing on Salt Lake City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the issue of whether Salt Lake City's inspection and 
supervision of the work performed by Okland Construction, and in connection 
therewith, on the vault cover, were activities related to Salt Lake City's 
proprietary functions, until he filed his Docketing Statement with the Court 
herein. See, Appellant's Docketing Statement, attached hereto as Addendum 
"G. , f 
Now, in the appeal brief Ingram has submitted, he admits that the 
proprietary function issue raised in the Docketing Statement is without merit 
Inasmuch as this Court has long since abandoned this doctrine, but utterly 
fails to set forth any other issues to be addressed by this Court in violation 
of Rule 24(a)(4) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See, Appellant's Brief 
at 13. Notwithstanding, Ingram's abandonment of the issue he originally 
raised on appeal and his omission to frame any other issue, Ingram appears, 
in Point II of his argument, to impliedly raise the issue that the initiation, 
supervision and inspection of the Beautification Project and construction by 
Okland Construction on the vault cover, in connection therewith, do not 
constitute the "exercise of a governmental function." Again, this particular 
argument and issue was never raised, by way of pleadings or at the hearing, 
in the court below. Indeed, in lngramls Statement of Facts, Ingram sets 
forth his contentions and responses to Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which is devoid of any mention of the issue he now seems to be 
raising. See, Appellant's Brief at 3-5. 
General principles of appellate review dictate "that matters neither raised 
in the pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered for the first 
7 
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time on appeal." Bundy v Century Equipment C o . , 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 
1984); Rosenlof v . Sull ivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Lamkin v . Lynch, 600 
P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); Reliable Furniture Co. v . Fidelity £ Guaranty Ins. 
Underwri ters, I n c . , 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963). This Court has 
declared that where a party pursues a motion for summary judgment on one 
claim, he may not, on appeal, either justify the grant of such motion or 
challenge its denial on the basis of a separate and distinct new claim. L £ A^  
Drywal l , I n c . , v . Whitmore Const. C o . , I n c . , 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). 
Indeed, this well-established principle of review governs absent exceptional 
circumstances, such as where "obvious injustice will ensue arising out of 
misunderstanding or f raud , reflecting unconscionability; . . . ." Flick v . 
Van Tassell , 547 P.2d 204, 205 (Utah 1976). 
In the present case, Ingram was cognizant of the facts and 
circumstances on which he bases his appeal from the outset, but failed to 
raise the proprietary-governmental issue or the governmental function issue of 
Point II in response to Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Indeed, in response to said Motion, Ingram filed the Affidavit of Kay R. 
Orverson and the Affidavit of Floyd Campbell. Record at 85-86 and 119-20. 
Mr . Dever testified that in his capacity as Ingram's counsel, he made certain 
exhibits available to Mr . Orverson for his review. Record at 109-10. 
Mr. Orverson testified that the manhole lid cover and ring were, in his 
opinion, defectively designed. Record at 119-20 (attached hereto as 
Addendum " H " ) . Mr. Campbell's testimony likewise dealt with the condition 
and installation of the vault cover. Record at 85-86 (attached hereto as 
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Addenum " I " ) . The aforementioned affidavits were the only pleadings 
contravening Salt Lake City's motion filed by Ingram . 
Thereafter, at said hearing on Salt Lake City's motion, Ingram's counsel 
did not raise the issue he set forth in his Docketing Statement or that he 
appears to be addressing in Point II of his Appellate Brief. Ingram's failure 
to raise these purported issues below did not arise out of misunderstanding 
or fraud, reflecting unconscionability. Thus, inasmuch as Ingram failed to 
raise below the issue stated in his Docketing Statement and the matters which 
appear to be raised in Point II of his brief, this appeal should be dismissed 
or, in the alternative, these matters should not be considered by the Court. 
Furthermore, Ingram's failure to state any cognizable issue in his appeal 
brief and his other repeated and consistent violations of this Court's 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, warrant dismissal of the instant appeal. Rule 
9 (c) (5 ) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that an appellant set 
forth a clear and concise statement of the issues presented on appeal in a 
Docketing Statement. The Advisory Committee Note to this rule observes that 
the Rule's "principal object . . . is to require counsel for the appellant to 
focus upon and frame the issues to be addressed in the appeal" to aid the 
Court in its duties. See, Utah R. App. P. 9(c)(5) advisory committee note. 
In the instant case, Ingram framed an issue never addressed in the 
District Court in violation of basic standards of appellate review and now 
admits that the issue is not legally cognizable, but failed to articulate any 
other issue in his Appeal Brief to be determined by this Court in violation of 
Rule 24(a)(4) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See, Appellant's Brief at 
13. The Rules of Appellate Procedure were drafted so as to clarify and 
9 
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simplify the matters to be addressed by this Court, the Advisory Committee 
in its Note to Rule 24 expressly admonishes that the requirement to set forth 
a statement of issues in an Appellant's brief is to be regarded as 
"particularly important." See, Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(4) Advisory Committee 
Note. 
Moreover, the practicable difficulties to Salt Lake City as a result of 
Ingram's inability to articulate the issue or issues on appeal are obvious and 
formidable. Respondent's counsel can only attempt to speculate on the 
specific legal arguments, if any, it should be asserting in response to 
Appellant's contention. Indeed, throughout this appeal proceeding, Salt Lake 
City has been placed in the position of attempting to anticipate and address 
Ingram's motions without the benefit of a statement of facts and memorandum 
of points and authorities in violation of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3) , Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Salt Lake City would submit that the admission that the 
issue set forth in his Docketing Statement is not viable and his failure to set 
forth any other issue, in light of his past repeated non-compliance with this 
Court's Rules merit dismissal of his appeal. 
ARGUMENT JJ[ 
EVEN IF THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED BELOW APPELLANT'S CLAIMS 
AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY ARE BARRED BY THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
A. In Contracting For the Construction of the Sugarhouse 
Beautification Project and the Subsequent Inspection, Design 
and Acceptance of Such Construction, Salt Lake City Was Engaged 
In the Exercise of a "Governmental Function" 
Notwithstanding Ingram's total failure to frame for this Court and Salt 
Lake City, the issue or issues he would assert as grounds for this appeal, 
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Salt Lake City will attempt to speculate and address the contentions set forth 
in his argument. However, in the interest of a clear and logical analysis of 
those arguments, Salt Lake City will address Point II of Ingram's Brief first. 
From an examination of Point I I , it appears that Ingram is contending 
that his alleged injuries resulted from Salt Lake City's operation of a water or 
sewer system, which activities he implies do not constitute the "exercise of a 
governmental function." Again it must be observed that this precise issue 
was not raised, by way of pleading or argument, in the court below. 
Since filing his Docketing Statement, Ingram has conceded that this 
Court, in a number of decisions, has "abolished the traditional 
governmental-proprietary analysis in deciding governmental immunity cases 
and opted instead for greater congruity in its decisions" by analyzing 
"'whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it 
can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the 
core of government activity.1" Richards v. Leavitt, et aJ., 21 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 32 (November 1 , 1985) (citing, Standiford v . Salt Lake City Corp., 605 
P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980)). 
The traditional governmental-proprietary function considerations in 
governmental immunity cases were abandoned as a result of the Utah State 
Legislature's passage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-1, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), which became effective in 1966. Madsen 
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983). This Act provides governmental 
immunity "for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental 
function." § 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. The Act, however, also specifically 
qualifies this immunity. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629. 
11 
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Since its passage, this Court has interpreted the Act mindful that 
,M[t]he legislature designed this statutory scheme to allow the courts 
flexibility and adaptability in fashioning consistent and rational limits to 
governmental immunity.IM kL (citing, Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
605 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1980)). The above-mentioned limits are to be 
fashioned by "the gradual process of interpretive litigation on the meaning of 
the key statutory term 'the exercise of a governmental function.Ml ]_d. To 
interpret this critical term the Court in Standiford established a test, i .e. , 
"whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it 
can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the 
core of governmental activity." Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 
P.2d, 1236-1237. In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 625 P.2d 432 (Utah 
1981), this test was further refined and clarified as follows: 
The first part of the Standiford test -activity of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental 
agency -does not refer to what government may do, but to what 
government alone must do . . . . [T]he second part of the 
Standiford test-"essential to the core of governmental activity" - , 
which refers to those activities not unique in themselves (and thus 
not qualifying under the first part) but essential to the 
performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental. 
kL at 434 (emphasis added). 
Applying the foregoing criteria to the activities of Salt Lake City upon 
which Ingram's claims are based, it would appear that such claims are barred 
because Ingram's injuries arose out of the exercise of a governmental 
function. Ingram alleged that his injuries arose when he stepped on the edge 
of an allegedly defective manhole or vault cover which gave way. Record at 
2-6 (Addendum "A" at tf 5 ) . Ingram further alleged that Salt Lake City was 
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negligent in failing to adequately inspect, design and accept the construction 
and installation of said cover by Okland Construction. Record at 2-6 
(Addendum "A" at f» 18 and 19). 
Said vault or manhole cover was constructed and installed in connection 
with the raising of the grade of the road and sidewalk located at 
approximately 2100 South and 1019 East as part of the Sugarhouse 
Beautification Project. Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . This Project was 
initiated by Salt Lake City to renovate and restore the Sugarhouse business 
area, thereby facilitating and improving parking and traffic movement in the 
area. Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . This overall Project was financed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Municipal Improvement District 
Act, §§ 10-16-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), which allows 
municipalities to make such improvements and obtain funding for their 
activities. Under this Act, only municipalities are given the power to make 
or cause such construction and/or improvements. See, § 10-16-4, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended). 
Such renovation and construction which includes the redesigning and 
raising of streets, sidewalks and parking areas and accepting and inspecting 
the construction done on the same, is an activity of such a unique nature 
that only governmental agencies or an agency granted this power, such as 
Salt Lake City, may perform and administer this type of project. Thus, 
under the criteria set forth in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230, 1232 (Utah 1980), Salt Lake City's activities in this regard constitutes 
an "exercise of a governmental function" under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
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This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the Utah Community 
Redevelopment Law, §§ 11-15-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), which 
allows public bodies such as municipalities, communities and some private 
enterprises to combine in their effort to redevelop slum and blighted 
properties. § 11-15-3, Utah Code Ann. The redevelopment authorized under 
this statute contemplates the replanning, redesign and construction of areas 
which are "stagnant or improperly utilized because of defective or inadequate 
street layout . . . or usefulness, or for other causes." See, 
§ 11-15-2(10)(c)(2), Utah Code Ann. A "blighted" area includes, among 
other problems, an area experiencing economic deterioration or disuse 
resulting from faulty planning when the area is also unfit for its intended 
purpose and conducive to juvenile delinquency or crime. § 11-15-2(11 ) ( f ) , 
Utah Code Ann. 
More significantly, although the statute provides for public and combined 
public and private action in these special redevelopment projects, the 
legislature has expressly declared that each redevelopment agency formed 
under this law "exercises governmental functions and has the powers 
prescribed in this act," and in carrying out these redevelopment activities, 
"[e]ach agency is performing a public function of the community." § 11-15-15 
and § 11-15-16, Utah Code Ann. (emphasis added). Thus, it would appear 
that the legislature intended that such redevelopment and renovation activities 
be interpreted as "exercises of governmental functions" so that entities 
performing those activities would be fostered and protected. 
Such redevelopment and renovation construction projects, like the 
Beautification Project, necessarily entail inspecting, designing and accepting 
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the construction work done by the contractor. Thus, under the explanation 
established in Johnson, such activities would be considered "essential to the 
core of governmental activities," i .e . , essential to the performance of unique 
governmental activities. As previously noted, Ingram alleged, as a cause of 
action against Salt Lake City, that his injuries arose out of its negligent 
failure to adequately inspect, design and accept the construction and 
installation of the vault cover by Okland Construction. Record at 2-6 
(Addendum "A" at 1NT 18 and 19). Therefore, Ingram's claims should be 
barred because the injuries he alleged arose from Salt Lake City's exercise of 
governmental functions in connection with its redevelopment and rehabilitative 
activities unless there is some applicable statutory waiver of immunity. 
Although there were no Utah cases or cases from other jurisdictions 
found which address this precise issue, Salt Lake City would submit that the 
cases cited by Ingram are distinguishable from the instant case in material 
aspects. Indeed, none of the cases cited in Ingram's Brief involve the 
precise activities which Ingram alleges caused his claimed injuries. 
In Cox v. Utah Mortgage and Loan Corp., et a[ . , 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 
(January 16, 1986), this Court admonished that, in determining whether the 
activities of a governmental agency constituted an exercise of governmental 
function, the focus must be on the "precise activity" out of which the alleged 
injury arose. kL at 20. In the case at bar, again the alleged negligent 
activities of Salt Lake City out of which his claimed injuries arose were the 
failure to adequately inspect, design and accept the construction and 
installation of the vault cover by Okland Construction relating to the 
Beautification Project. Record at 2-6. These cases cited by Ingram, 
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however, all involve activities and operations distinctly different from such 
activities. 
Ingram cites Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), in 
which the plaintiff brought an action against the City for property damages 
she allegedly sustained when the City's sewer line backed up into her 
basement. kL Thus, the particular activity at issue in this case was the 
negligent maintenance of the sewer system. kL at 738. 
Again, Ingram does not claim that his injuries arose out of the operation 
of the sewer system, rather he alleges that they resulted from Salt Lake 
City's negligent failure to adequately inspect, design and accept the work of 
Okland Construction in connection with a renovation project. Therefore, the 
Thomas case would not appear to be dispositive authority for Ingram's 
contentions. 
Likewise, Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676 P.2d 399 
(Utah 1984), involves materially different issues from the instant case. In 
Dalton the issue addressed was the applicability of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act's notice requirement to a claim based upon the negligent 
maintenance and repair of a sewer system. kL at 399-400. As with the 
Thomas case, the precise activity at issue in Dalton renders it inapplicable to 
the case at bar. 
B. Ingram's Claims Are Barred Because the Claims Resulted 
From the Exercise of a Governmental Function and Ingram 
Has Failed to Establish Any Waiver of Such Immunity 
With regard to Point I of Ingram's argument, it would appear that he is 
contending that one of the statutory waivers enumerated in Title 63 of the 
62h 
Utah Code is applicable to the present case. Thus, he may maintain his 
cause of action against Salt Lake City, even though his alleged injuries arose 
out of Salt Lake City's exercise of a governmental function. More 
particularly, Ingram relies on § 63-30-8, Utah Code Ann. which provides as 
follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, 
bridge, viaduct or other structure located thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8. Ingram asserts that, although the vault cover 
was located in an area between the sidewalk and street, this area he has 
designated as a "parkway" should be deemed, for purposes of this case, to 
be a sidewalk. Accordingly, he argues the foregoing statute governs this 
case. 
Such an argument, however, overlooks other more relevant sections of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, their precise language and the specific 
allegations Ingram has made regarding the cause of his claimed injuries. 
In paragraphs 18 and 19 of Ingram's Complaint, he alleges as follows: 
18. The design and installation of said manhole cover was 
such that ordinary pedestrians would not have detected its 
negligent design and construction. 
19. Defendant Salt Lake City was negligent in the inspection 
and acceptance of defendant Okland's work product and tRe 
permitting of the continuance of the existence of a negligent 
condition and failing to remedy an obvious defect in a public 
sidewalk. 
Record at 2-6 (Addendum "A" at MI 18 and 19) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act specifically provides in pertinent 
part: 
17 
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Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of 
employee—Exceptions—Waiver for injury caused by violation of 
fourth amendment r ights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of hj£ employment except if the 
injury: . . . . ; 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by 
reason of making an inadequate 0£ negligent inspection oT"any 
property. 
Section 63-30-10(1 ) ( d ) , Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) (emphasis 
added) . Thus , the Act specifically excludes from waiver all claims based 
upon negligent inspection. Accordingly, it is clear that Ingram^ claims as to 
negligent inspection against Salt Lake City are barred by the foregoing 
provision. 
Moreover, lngram*s conclusion that , despite the fact that the vault cover 
was located in an area between the sidewalk and the street , this Court should 
regard the vault cover as being located on a sidewalk for purpose of this 
appeal, overlooks other sections of the Governmental Immunities Act which 
expressly govern instances where an alleged injury arises from a structure or 
improvement not expressly addressed by the other sections regarding waiver 
of immunity. Section 63-30-9 , Utah Code A n n . , provides: 
Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or defective public 
building, s t ructure , or other public improvement-- Except ion.- -
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public 
building, st ructure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. 
Immunity ji£ not waived for latent defective conditions. 
Section 63-30-9, Utah Code Ann . (emphasis added) . 
Again, it is critical to note that the vault cover was installed in its 
location by Okland Construction as part of an area-wide renovation project 
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and Ingram admits that it was not located on a public sidewalk. 
Consequently, Salt Lake City would submit that, if anything, the vault cover 
and its installation constitute an "other public improvement" within the 
meaning of the foregoing statute. Accordingly, if Ingram's alleged injuries 
were caused by the vault cover as a result of a latent defect, immunity from 
Ingram's claim is not waived. 
For this reason, Ingram's reference to Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1976), is not dispositive authority in the present case because in 
Murray, the plaintiff brought an action against the City for injuries sustained 
when he allegedly fell into a hole in the sidewalk which had formerly held a 
water meter subsequently removed by the City. kL at 897 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, Ingram admits that the vault cover was not located on 
the sidewalk. Moreover, the Court in that case appears to employ the 
outdated "proprietary-governmental function" analysis, hi dicta, in regard to 
the classification of the water meter hole. kL at 897. Finally, in Murray, 
the plaintiff's injuries did not arise out of any type of renovation or 
beautification project under construction by a municipality which, as 
evidenced above, is, inherently a "governmental function." 
Likewise, Ingram's reference to Bowden v. Riverton, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1983) is not relevant to the instant case inasmuch as it examines a city's duty 
to maintain city streets and as all the parties hereto agree the vault cover at 
issue was not located on a public street. 
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ARGUMENT U± 
IN THE INSTANT CASE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AS TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF A LATENT DEFECT BECAUSE INGRAM MADE NO 
SHOWING OF SALT LAKE CITY'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENT 
INSPECTION IN THE COURT BELOW 
As previously discussed under § 63-30-9, Utah Code Ann. , governmental 
immunity is not waived for injuries arising from latent defective conditions 
contained in other public improvements such as the vault cover. The term 
"latent defect," as used in this statute, means , ![a] defect which reasonable 
careful inspection will not reveal." Vincent v . Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 
105, 107 (Utah 1978) (quoting, Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968). 
At the time of Ingram's alleged accident, the vault cover or manhole had 
been constructed and installed in its present state for only two months. 
Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . The Project was not completed until two 
months after the accident. Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . Inspection of 
such vault covers were made visually by Salt Lake City's agents. Record at 
75-78 (Addendum "C") . Courts have determined that a sufficient period of 
time must lapse before a governmental agency should notice a latent defect. 
Freeport Transportation Inc. v. Kentucky, 408 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1966). A 
two month period in a project of this size would not give Salt Lake City a 
reasonable amount of time to discover any latent defect in the vault cover, 
consisting of a ring and cover which, if fitted properly, appeared to be 
without defect, because the cover represented only a very small part of a 
$2,400,000 Project. Record at 75-78 (Addendum "C") . 
Furthermore, although ordinarily questions of negligence cannot be 
settled on a motion for summary judgment, summary judgment is a proper 
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method of eliminating a negligence cause of action when no showing of the 
defendant's alleged negligence is made. Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 
436 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (1968). 
Ingram, in response to Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment 
submitted the Affidavits of Floyd Campbell and Kay R. Orverson. Record at 
85-86 and 119-20 (Addendums " I " and "H") . A thorough examination of these 
affidavits reveal that there is no assertion in either that Salt Lake City's 
visual inspection of the vault cover was not done in accordance with industry 
standard. Record at 85-86 and 119-20 (Addendums " l f f and "H") . Thus, 
Ingram submitted no evidence of Salt Lake City's alleged negligent inspection 
of the cover. Therefore, there was no question of fact before the Court 
below as to that issue and entry of summary judgment was proper. 
Moreover, notwithstanding this lack of evidence of the alleged negligent 
inspection by Salt Lake City, as previously observed, § 63-30-10(1)Cd) 
excludes from waiver of immunity all claims based upon negligent inspection. 
Accordingly, because Ingram's alleged injuries arose out of the exercise of a 
governmental function on the part of Salt Lake City and the negligent acts 
alleged against it have not been waived by any provision of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Ingram's claims are barred and the order of the 
Court below granting Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ingram's arguments regarding whether his alleged injuries arose out of 
Salt Lake City's exercise of a governmental function was not raised as an 
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issue, by pleading or argument before the District Court. Therefore, Ingram 
has waived this issue and may not now challenge the decision of the Court 
based upon this contention. 
Additionally, Salt Lake City would submit that the Ingram's failure to 
frame any issue to be addressed by the Court and Salt Lake City when 
viewed in light of his many past violations of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure warrant the dismissal of the instant appeal. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that Ingram claims that his alleged 
injuries resulted from the negligent design and/or inspection of a vault cover 
installed as part of a plan of renovation, known as the Sugarhouse 
Beautification Project. This Project, its construction, administration and 
acceptance by Salt Lake City is an activity of such a unique nature that only 
a governmental agency, such as Salt Lake City, could implement such a 
project. Therefore, the administration, construction, inspection and 
acceptance of this Project by Salt Lake City was an exercise of a 
governmental function and under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Ingram's injuries, which resulted therefrom, are barred inasmuch as he has 
failed to allege any facts surrounding his claim which would constitute a 
waiver of immunity under the Act. 
Finally, the District Court's disposition of the case on summary judgment 
was proper given Ingram's failure to produce any evidence that Salt Lake City 
was negligent in inspecting the vault cover. 
Accordingly, because Ingram's claims are barred by statute, and/or are 
outside of the record, Salt Lake City requests that the Third District Court's 
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decision grant ing Salt Lake City's summary judgment be affirmed and Ingram's 
appeal herein be dismissed. 
DATED this ( j t E O day of May, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Donald J 
irbara K. Berrett Bar 
FOWLER S PURSER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Barbara K. Berrett, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of Fowler & Purser attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondents, Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation. 
That she mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of Respondents' Brief 
upon the parties to the within described action addressed to: 
L. A. Dever 
Robert M. McRae 
McRae & DeLand 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first class, 
postage prepaid, on the 6th day of May, 1986. 
Barbara K. Berrett 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6th day QjLMay, 1986 
Notary 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
^ 
My Commission Exnires: 
ROBERT M. McRAE, *2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 Nortn 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
/ / 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, SALT LAKE 
CITY, a municipal corporation, 
and OKLAND CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No 
£ci^: ;4i? 
Fiaintiff complains of defenaant and alleges as 
VENUE 
2. On August 18, 1984, at approximately 12:00 neon, 
:tifi v.-as operating a 1984 Ford Bronco II on Highway 40 at 
:.i:,,ctcly i:\ile post 167 in Uintah County, utan. 
ADDENDUM MA,f 
000002 
3. At the above time and place plaintiff's vehicle 
veered off of the main portion of Highway 40 and into a ditch 
striking the opposing side of said ditch in a head on fashion. 
4. At the time and place in question plaintiff was 
properly wearing his shoulder harness type seat belt installed 
as original equipment on tne suoject vehicle. 
5. As a result of the impact plaintiff was injured 
sustaining a compression fracture to his thoracic lumbar 
spinal area. 
6. The subject motor vehicle was manufactured, 
designed and placed in commerce by the defendant. 
LIABILITY ALLEGATIONS 
7. Plaintiff at all times was entitled to rely upon 
the express and implied warranties of defendant that the use 
of a seat belt restraint was a safety device. 
&. As a result of the suo^ect collision and impact 
the retraction device contained in tne vail of tne driver's 
si^e oi the subject motor venicie disiocgec frui: its mounting. 
9. Defendant was negligent in tne design of tne 
mounting oracket for the retraction device oolt in permitting 
: jcn a des igned- device to De used for tne intended safety of 
occupants of motor vehicles. 
10. The sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries 
is a design defect whicn could be both economically and 
feasibly corrected and but for said design defect plaintiff 
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would not have been injured in tne manner and to the extent 
that ne has been injured, 
DAMAGES 
11. As a result of the foregoing accident, plaintiff 
sustained a compression fracture wnich will cause him both 
temporary and permanent partial disability and has and will 
sustain medical bills in amounts yet to be determined. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
12. Tne subject aesign of the mounting bracket for 
shoulder harness on Ford Bronco II is an oovious defect. 
13. Defendant Ford Motor Company is guilty of gross 
negligence ana willful, wanton misconduct in failing to 
adequately safety test vehicles of the design and nature of 
the venicle plaintiff was driving entitling plaintiff to an 
award of general ana punitive damages as well as reimbursement 
for all r.edical expenses. 
CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY AND OKLAND CONSTRUCTION 
1^. On ucic^er 17, 19 b4, the plaintiff was seeking 
tnerapy at the Enie-.cs Ctncpedic Appliance store in Salt La-;e 
City, u t c n. 
15. .Upon e>:ii:nc saia business establishment, 
plaintiff was on a public sidewalK and stepped on a water 
meter cover. 
16. Said water meter cover had been installed as a 
Sugarhouse Beautification Project under a contract between 
-3-
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defendant Salt Lake City and defendant OKland, who was the 
contractor performing the necessary work. 
17. Defendant Okland was negligent in the 
installation of the man-hole cover in that said man-hole cover 
rested on top of the sidewaiK surface and was not designed in 
a proper manner with a ring to hold said man-hole cover below 
the sidewalk surface. 
18. The design and installation of said man-hole 
cover was such that an ordinary pedestrian would not have 
detected its negligent design and construction. 
19. Defendant Salt Lake City was negligent in the 
inspection and acceptance of defendant OKland's work product 
and the permitting of the continuance of the existence of a 
negligent condition and failing to remedy an obvious defect in 
a public sidewalk. 
20. By virtue of tne acts of these defendants 
plaintiff fell into the subject man-hole and potentially 
ccmpounaeo injuries £!:•.:«; £-j£wi inea mere particularly set 
fort::": in pa r a~rap.: :-. ." :;iru..j 12 ac :*. e. 
21. ine sc~s u: these defendants; were in gross 
disregard lor the :.;:..::. safety cf persons sucn as the 
plaintiff, eniiii::-: ;l-ir^iii to punitive damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests tne trier of facts to 
av;ard a judgment for all carnages, ootn general and special, 
sustained by plaintiff as a result of each accident and to 
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apportion those damages in an equitable fashion to the 
defendants according to their contribution to the negligence; 
for costs and reasonable legal fees; and for such other and 
further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
DATED this Jtf day of December, 1984. 
MCRAE & DeLAND 
\^^f U^/£ 
ROBERT M. MCRAE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to Ray Christensen, 
Attorney for Defendant Ford Motor Company, 900 Kearns 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this / / day of 
Decerr.oer, 1984. 
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DONALD J . PURSER, #2663 
MARK A. LARSEN, # 3 7 2 7
 /^- ' j.t m 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t s Okland^fc 
5 2 0 B o s t o n B l d g . Qp~ 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 531-0441 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L . INGRAM, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s • 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No . C 8 4 - 7 4 1 7 
J u d g e Homer F . W i l k i n s o n 
P u r s u a n t t o U t a h R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 56 , d e f e n d a n t S a l t 
L a n e C i t y m o v e s t h e C o u r t t o e n t e r j u d g m e n t i n i t s f a v o r on t h e 
g r o u n d s a n d f o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h e M e m o r a n d u m i n 
S u r - p c r t of S a l t L a k e C i t y ' s M o t i o n f o r Summary J u d g m e n t . 
DATED t h i s 2 4 t h day of May, 1 9 B 5 . 
Wyb JTfMJRSER. 
MARK A. LARSEN 
A t t o r n e y s f o r S a l t L a k e C i t y 
ADDENDUM MBM 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to Robert M. McRae, Esq., at 209 E. 100 N., Vernal, Utah 84078 
this 24th day of May, 1985; postage prepaid. 
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I FILMED 
DONALD J. PURSER, #2663 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants Okland-,,fr_Salt -JLatae—g 
520 Boston Bldg. "'.• '.',..•-:-iu:i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 rn)^ " 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PARVIZ ROKHVA 
Civil No. C84-7417 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant Salt Lake City submits the following Affidavit in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment: 
C 0 U N T Y 0 F ? \ L T L AK E ) 
: ss . 
.TE OF YT;J^ ) 
Parv iz . Rokhva, a f t e r . f i r s t b e i n g du ly sworn, deposes and 
says as f o l l o w s : 
1. I am over 21 years of age and have p e r s o n a l knowledge of 
the f a c t s conta ined in t h i s A f f i d a v i t . 
2. I am employed by S a l t Lake C i t y in t h e E n g i n e e r i n g 
D e p a r t m e n t , which i s s u b j e c t t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e P u b l i c 
Works Department . 
3. During the bui lding s tage , I was assigned as the project 
ADDENDUM " C 0 OQO? 3 
engineer for the Salt Lake Beautification Project* 
4. The S a l t Lake B e a u t i f i c a t i o n P r o j e c t c o n s i s t e d of 
renovat ion of the Sugarhouse area; i n i t i a l l y the contract with 
the general contractor, Okland Construction Company, was for 
$1,879,000.00; through change orders, th is amount later was in-
creased to approximately $2,400,000.00. 
5. The construction for the Salt Lake Beautification Project 
s t a r t e d on March 5, 1984, and was s u b s t a n t i a l l y complete on 
December 4, 1984. 
6. Among other th ings , I was in charge of supervis ing the 
inspection of this particular project; in inspecting a project of 
t h i s s i z e , an inspector for Sa l t Lake City would concentrate on 
the o v e r a l l job, including the qual i ty of the workmanship, the 
q u a n t i t i e s being ut i l ized, and other major aspects of the job. 
7. On a project of t h i s s i z e , the inspec t ion of a water 
rr.eter v a u l t i s made by v i s u a l means only. 
S. Af te r .:r. Ingram's a c c i d e n t , I p e r s o n a l l y inspec ted the 
w a t e r meter v a u l t , which i s the sub jec t m a t t e r of t h i s l a w s u i t 
ar.d located approximately 1019 E. 2100 So., Sa l t Lake City, Utah, 
and which was raised to grade by Okland Construction Company in 
mid-August 1984. 
9. The water meter vaul t i s loca ted in the park a r e a , the 
a r ea between the curb and gutter for the s t r e e t and the sidewalk; 
000076 
it is not part of either the street or the sidewalk. 
10. At the most, the work which Okland performed in raising 
this particular water meter vault to grade was worth $200.00. 
11. The defect in the lid for the water meter vault is not 
obvious or subject to detection through a reasonably thorough 
inspection; if centered properly, the lid can be walked on; it is 
only when the lid is off-center that it may constitute a hazard-
ous condition. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 1985. 
PARVIZ rtdKHVA 
Subscribed and sworn to before meHhis 24th day of May, 
1985. 
*^"\ 
0 i: 
VOTh¥?\r PUBLIC resicinc ir 
/ \ 
My Commission Expires 
& // is* o. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to Robert M. McRae, Esq., at 209 E. 100 N.# Vernal, Utah 84078 
this 24th day of May, 1985; postage prepaid. 
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FILMED nt}*^"-*** R*X*£*W' 
DONALD J, PURSER, #2663 
MARK A. LARSEN, #3727 
Attorneys for Defendants Okland & ^cU-^-bske' Gi4y^ 
520 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, e t a l . f 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY's MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C84-7417 
Judge Homer F. Wi lk inson 
D e f e n d a n t S a l t L a k e C i t y ("SLC") f i l e s t h e f o l l o w i n g 
Memorandum in Suppor t of --Motion fo r Summary J u d g m e n t : 
1. SLC c o n t r a c t e d w i t h d e f e n d a n t O k l a n d C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. 
( " O k l a n d " ) f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e S a l t L a k e B e a u t i f i c a t i c n 
P r o j e c t ( t h e " P r o j e c t " ) ; o r i g i n a l l y , t h e a m o u n t of t h e c o n t r a c t 
was $ 1 , 8 7 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ; t h r o u g h c h a n g e o r d e r s , t h i s a m o u n t l a t e r was 
i n c r e a s e d t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 2 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . A f f i d a v i t of P s r v i : 
Rokhva p a r a g r a p h 4 ("Rokhva A f f i d a v i t " ) . 
2 . The P r o j e c t was s t a r t e d on M a r c h 5 , 1 9 8 4 , a n d w a s 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y comple te on December 5 , 1 9 3 4 . I d . a t p a r a g r a p h 5 . 
3 . As p a r t of t h e S u g a r h o u s e B e a u t i f i c a t i o n P r o j e c t , t h e 
g r a d e of t h e road known as 2 1 s t South was r a i s e d . 
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4. A water meter vault, located between the sidewalk and the 
curb and gutter for 21st South, at 1019 E. 2100 S., Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which is on the north side of 2100 So., also was 
raised to the grade of the sidewalk. Id. at paragraph 9. 
5. The construction for the water meter vault was completed 
in mid-August 1984 (Id.) and was valued at approximately $200.00 
(Id. at paragraph 10). 
6. Plaintiff Ronald L. Ingram ("Ingram") on August 18, 1984, 
was injured in an automobile accident. Complaint paragraphs 2-5. 
7. On October 17, 1984, allegedly Ingram stepped on the edge 
of the water meter cover, which gave way, allowing Ingram to fall 
into the water meter vault. See Complaint paragraph 14; 
Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories dated February 6, 1985, 
Answer No. 21 
8. The lid and ring for the water meter vault appear to 
contain a latent defect. Id. at paragraph 11. 
9. Ingram filed a Complaint against Salt Lake City, among 
others, dated December 14, 1984, alleging the negligence of Salt 
LQV.S City as a proximate cause of his subsequent injuries. 
10. This matter is now before the Court on Salt Lake City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INGRAM'S CLAIMS AGAINST SLC ARE 
BARRED EY THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
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Ingram's claims against SLC are barred by the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Utah Code Anno. § 63-30-13. Ingram alleges the 
negligence of SLC in paragraphs 18 & 19 of his Complaint, which 
state as follows: 
18. The design and installation of said 
man-hole cover was such that an ordinary 
pedestrian would not have detected its 
negilgent design and construction. 
19. Defendant Salt Lake City was negli-
gent in the inspection and acceptance 
of defendant Okland's work product and 
the permitting of the continuance of the 
existence of a negligent condition and 
failing to remedy an obvious defect in 
a public sidewalk. 
Addressing the first part of paragraph 19 first, the 
Governmental Immunity Act specifically excludes all claims based 
upon negligent inspection. Utah Code Anno. § 63-30-10(1)( d ) 
(Supp. 1983) states: 
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee— 
Exceptions—Waiver for injury caused by 
violation of fourth amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all govern-
mental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within 
the scope of his employment except if the 
injury: 
. . . . 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an in-
adequate or negligent inspection of any 
property 
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Consequently, Ingram cannot recover against SLC based upon SLC's 
a l l e g e d negl igence in inspec t ion of Okland's work. 
Concerning the a l l e g a t i o n of a l a t e n t defect in paragraphs 
18 & 19 of t h e Complaint, the water meter v a u l t i s l o c a t e d b e t e e n 
the s idewalk and the s t r e e t . Consequently, because i t i s ne i ther 
part of the sidewalk or s t r e e t , the water meter vaul t c o n s t i t u t e s 
an "other public improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code 
Anno. § 63-30-9 which s t a t e s : 
Waiver of immunity for injury from 
dangerous or d e f e c t i v e publ ic b u i l d -
ing, s tructure , or other public im-
provement—Exception.—Immunity from 
sui t of a l l governmental e n t i t i e s i s 
waived for any injury caused from a 
dangerous or d e f e c t i v e condit ion of 
any public bu i ld ing , s tructure , dam, 
reservoir or other public improvement. 
Immunity i s not waived for l a t e n t 
defec t ive - ' cond i t ions . 
(Emphasis added. ) 
The term "latent, d e f e c t " as used in the emphasized language 
means " [ a ] d e f e c t v;hich r e a s o n a b l e c a r e f u l i n s p e c t i o n w i l l no t 
r e v e a l . " V i n c e n t v. S a l t Lake ' County , 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 
1978). At the time of Ingram's a l l eged a c c i d e n t , the water meter 
v a u l t had been c o n s t r u c t e d in i t s p r e s e n t s t a t e for on ly two 
months. The P ro jec t was not completed u n t i l two months a f t e r the 
a c c i d e n t . A s u f f i c i e n t p e r i o d of t i m e mus t l a p s e b e f o r e a 
g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y s h o u l d n o t i c e a l a t e n t d e f e c t . 
F r e e p o r t Transpor ta t ion Inc . v. Kentucky, 408 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 
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1966) . The method of i n s p e c t i o n a water meter v a u l t i n a p r o j e c t 
of t h i s s i z e would not g i v e SLC a reasonab le amount of t ime to 
d i scover t h i s la tent de fec t . Rokhva Aff idavi t paragraphs 7 & 11. 
The water meter vault represented only a very small part of 
a $2,400,000.00 project . I t cons i s ted of a ring and cover which 
e x i s t e d prior to the construct ion and which, i f f i t t e d properly, 
appeared to be wi thout de fec t . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , summary judgment shou ld be e n t e r e d in SLC's 
favor b e c a u s e Ingram's c l a i m s are barred by the Governmantal 
Immunity Act-• 
DATED t h i s 24th day of May, 1985. 
MARK A. L, 
Attorr.evs for Salt Lak< 
K 
. r _c-.. 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I have mailed a copy of the foregoing 
t o Robert; M. XcRae, Esq. , a t 209 E. 100 N., V e r n a l , Utah S407S 
t h i s 24th day of May, 19S5; postage prepaid. 
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DONALD J. PURSER 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City 
and Okland Construction Company 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, SALT LAKE 
CITY, a municipal corporation, 
and OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMFANY, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FREDRICK L. 
STRASSER IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C84-7417 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant Okland Construction Company ("Okland") 
submits the . following Affidavit of Fredrick L. Strasser in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
£S 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Fredrick L. Strasser. being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. During the summer of 1984/ I was Okland's project 
superintendent for the Salt Lake City Beautification Project 
(the "Project")/ and have personal knowledge of the facts 
stated in this Affidavit. 
2. I was responsible for the overall supervision, 
construction and inspection of the Project. 
3. I am personally familiar with and have examined the 
water meter vault ring and lid which is in controversy in 
this case. 
4. The Specifications for the Project entitled 
"Raising Structures to Grade" and relating to rings and 
covers is found in Section 02401 in Part 2.01/ and states: 
201. FRAMES/ COVERS/ AND GRATINGS: 
Unless specified otherwise or directed by 
Engineer, existing frames/ lids, any gratings 
will be reused. 
5. Okland did not purchase the water meter vault ring 
and cover in controversy or, as a matter of fact/ any other 
water meter vault rings or covers and the engineer did not 
direct Okland to use anything other than the existing ring 
and lid. 
6. Okland followed the preceding specification in 
raising the water meter lid and cover to grade. 
7. Normally/ a water meter lid and cover is visually 
inspected: there were numerous rings and covers involved in 
the Project. 
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8. Personally/ I have examined a large number of water 
meter vault rings and lids; on the Project/ over 200 rings 
and lids were raised to grade, 
9. At the time the Project was under construction/ 
nothing about the particular water meter lid and cover/ based 
upon a visual inspection/ caused me to believe that it was 
not in compliance with industry standards; the cover and lid 
could have had concentric rings underneath the cover to keep 
it from sliding, 
10. The underneath of the cover is ribbed; the workmen 
installing the cover easily could have assumed that these 
crossing- ribs were designed to keep the lid in place and to 
keep it from sliding, 
DATED this Jtf1^ day cf June, 1965. 
FREDERICK L. STRASSER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORK to before me this r^ ?/" da; 
June, 1965. 
Notary Public , // * s? 
Residing at: &W& ^Vo/CJL C~<> . 
, 7 
Ky Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the undersigned hand-delivered 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Fredrick L, Strasser in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment to the following this Z^C^^—TJay of June, 1985: 
Robert M. McRae 
McRae & Deland 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
The Whitley Mansion 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DONALD J. PURSER 
MARK A. LARSEN 
A t t o r n e y s for S a l t Lake Ci ty 
and Okland Cons truc t ion Company 
520 Boston B u i l d i n g 
9 Exchange Place 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 531-0441 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
AUG 211985 
?%?** 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, SALT LAKE 
CITY, a municipal corporation, 
and OKLAN-D CONSTRUCTION' COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C84-7417 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
JU ;,-*— £_ — +-
On July 26, 1?85, plaintifffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and defendant Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary 
r~r? cr for hearing before the above-capticned 
the Hcnoratle Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
Plaintiff was represented by Lee Dever; defendants were 
represented by Mark A. Larsen. After considering the 
pleadings, Memoranda, Affidavits and other documents in the 
file, and the oral arguments of counsel, and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as 
follows : 
m t S a l t Lake C i t y ' s Motion f o r Summary IjL^l 
mted ; te4*e—-£omplaint a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t S a l t / 
1 . P l a i n t i f f ' s Mot ion f o r Summary Judgment i s d e n i e d , 
2. Defendai 
Judgment i s g r a n ; tine C o l a i n t - e 
DATED t h i s }s ( day of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 5 . 
BY THE COURT: 
*ts$&? 
*i 
-^JV^zfOl^^— 
OMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
fl iKSBUW/iSlr. I 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation ana OKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No. 
Plaintiff/Appellant hereby submits the following 
Docketing Statement in compliance with Rule 73A, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Rule 72, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that this is an appeal from 
an Order of tne Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, dismissing Salt Lake City Corporation 
as a party defendant on August 21, 1985, which Order became 
final after the trial against Okland Construction Company, 
Judgment being filed and entered by the Clerk of the Court on 
October 9, 1985. 
ADDENDUM "G" 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS .an of 
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that it was merely following the contract and engineering 
specifications which was the finding of the jury. Appellant 
clafifcS *WllJ*lW!fr'*eperatio* of water services is a proprietary 
function and the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply. 
ISSUE PRESENTED BY APPEAL 
Is the design and inspection by Salt Lake City of a 
contractor's work done under Salt Lake City's direction on 
culinary water vaults in a remodeling project a proprietary 
function for which immunity does not exist or a discretionary 
function for which immunity does apply? 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement 
District et al., 398 P.2d 203 (16 Utah 2d 198, 1965); 
Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896 (1976); 
Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 412 P. 2d 449 (17 Utah 2d 
362, 1966); and 
Gordon v. Provo City, 391 P.2d 430 (15 Utah 2d 287, 
1964). 
ATTACHMENTS 
1. Complaint 
2. Answer of Salt Lake City Corporation 
3. motion to Dismiss Salt Lake City Corporation 
4. Order of Dismissal of Salt Lake City Corporation 
5. Objection to Order of Dismissal 
6. Judgment on Verdict 
-3-
DATED th i s _ 5 T < 3 a y of J[rHh. 1985. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT Ml^ McRAE T 
r.« &J 'TiP.yjK v 
Atto/neys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to Donald J. Purser, 
Attorney for Defendant, 340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84: 
' for Defendant, 340 East fourth south, salt L< 
1111 on this n day of \ <j. '^VW IN , 1985. 
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ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a m u n i c i p a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n and OKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
D e f e n d a n t s , 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C84-7417 
Judge Homer F* Wilkinson 
ss, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Uintah ) 
KAY R. ORVERSON, being first: duly sworn upon his oatn 
deposes and states that: 
1. He is tne Puoiic Works Director of Vernal City 
Corporation, Vernal, Utah, and has held such joo capacity 
for ^'-'. 'L_ years, 
2. Affiant examined Ingram deposition Exhibits 1-10 
and 1-4 attached to the Affidavii: of L. A. Dever for purposes 
of determining whether or not tne manhole ring design for 
purposes of retaining, restraining and securing a manhole 
ADDENDUM MH" 
cover sucn as the one identified in Exhibits 1-10 was designed 
and property installed. 
3. Based upon an examination of Exhibits 1-10 and 
the industry standards outlined in 1-4 attached to the 
Affidavit of L. A. Dever, the manhole design, lid cover, ring 
securing devise (the latter of which is not existant) was 
designed and defectively installed in violation of reasonable 
and ordinary construction standards. Page 4 of said exhibits 
specifically requiring a utility ring or sidewalk manhole ring 
when using a cover in ordinary foot, pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic areas, the purpose of same being to not permit the 
type of accident which took place and is described in both the 
depositions of Parviz Rokhva and Fred Strother. 
DATED this £Z day of July, 1985. 
Sabscrioed and sworn to oefore z^ zr>. zr.is __~^ L^ ^a<* 
Juiv, 1G85. 
My commission expires: NOTARY 
%£. 
~>- S^' tf^ Residi::c LZ Vernal, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAI LILT 
I do nereDy certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
•true and correct copy of the foregoing :: Judge Homer F. 
WiiKinson, P.O. Box 1860/ Salt Lake City, Utah £4110, and to 
Donald J. Parser, Attorney for Def er.dar.ts, 520 Boston 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 en this ^2. ^ °aY of 
July, 1985. 
Utrr--—~~ 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84 078 
(801) 789-1666 
m o IK CLERK'S OFFICE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FONALD L. INGRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation and OKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT £?4- 7^/7 
Civil No.-£04 7414 • 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
STATE Or UTAH ) 
ss, 
County of Uintah ) 
FLOYD KAY CAMPBELL, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. Affiant is a licensed plumbing contractor 
in the Eiate cf Utah, License No. 
2. Affiant is acquainted with proper plumbing 
standards in the industry for the setting cf water meter 
man hole lids and more particularly in side walk areas and 
particularly in areas subject to pedestrian or vehicle traffic 
of any kind. 
ADDENDUM "I" 
3. Affiant has examined Ingram deposition exhibits 
one through ten dated January 16, 1985, and observes that 
the man hole lid does not set in a ring type devise making 
the top service of the lid securely flush with the top of 
the man hole liner and securing it in position so that it 
will not slide from its place of rest and cannot tilt when 
weight is applied to an edge of the lid. 
4. The above observations are a reiteration of 
proper safety standards in the plumbing industry in the 
State of Utah and have been far in excess of ten years. 
5. Should a man hole be required to be raised 
to a higher level from its former position there are numerous 
available and convenient methods of installing a proper 
ring holder over the existing man hole liner and existing 
ring to insure meeeting proper industry standards. 
DATED this // day of June, 1985. 
F. KAY' CAMPBELL ~0 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforme me this / / 
My coirjnission exoires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of 
Robert Michael McRae, Affidavit of Floyd Kay Campbell and 
Notice of Hearing to Donald J. Purser, Attorney for Defendant 
520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 on this /, 
day of June, 1985. 
'«jr~^r 
10-16-1. Ihflrt title of act.—This act shall be known and may be cited 
aa the Utah Municipal Improvement District Act. 
Bauffj: L. xeee, c*. a?, § L 
10-1M. Powera of municipality.—(1) The governing body of anv 
municipality shall have power to make or cause to be made any one or more 
or combination of the following improvements: 
fa) To establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and 
widen any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility; 
(b) To improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer, 
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking 
facility; 
(c) To construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, side-
walks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains, flood 
barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain, or 
repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating equipment) 
for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improvement of a 
previously established municipally owned electrical distribution system, 
to a district within the boundaries of the municipality; 
(d) To plant or cause to be planted, set out, cultivate and maintain 
lawns, shade trees or other landscaping; 
(e) To cover, fence, safeguard or euclose reservoirs, canals, ditches and 
watercourses and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain and repair 
waterworks, reservoirs, canals, ditches, pipes, mains, hydrants, and other 
water facilities for the purpose of supplying water for domestic and irriga-
tion purposes or either, regulating, controlling or distributing the same and 
regulating and controlling water and watercourses leading into the mu-
nicipality ; 
(f) To acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair 
parking lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets; 
(g) To acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair any 
of the improvements authorized in this section for use in connection with an 
industrial or research park except that this act may not be used to pay 
the cost of buildings or structures used for industry or research; 
(h) To acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair 
parks and other recreational facilities; 
(i) To remove any nonconforming existing improvements in the areaa 
to be improved; 
(j) To construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair optional im-
provements ; 
(k) To acquire any property necessary or advisable in order to make 
any of such improvements; 
(1) To make any other improvements now or hereafter authorized by 
any other law, the cost of which in whole or in part can properly be de-
termined to be of particular benefit to a particular area within the 
municipality; 
(m) To construct and install all such structures, equipment and other 
items and to do all such other work as may be necessary or appropriate 
to complete any of such improvements in a proper manner. 
(2) For the purpose of making and paying for all or a part of the 
cost of any of such improvements (including optional improvements), 
the governing body of a municipality may create special improvement dis-
tricts within the municipality, levy assessments on the property within such 
a diatriet which is benefited by the making of the improvements and issue 
interim warrants and special improvement bonds as provided in thia act. 
11-16-1. Short title—This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Community Redevelopment Law." 
HUtory: I*. 1966, c*. 13, § 1. 
11-16-2. Daftnitions.—The definitions and general provisions contained 
in this article govern the construction of this act, unless the context other-
wise requires. 
1. "Community" means a city of the first or second class as defined in 
section 17-16-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, or a combination thereof. 
2. "Agency" means a redevelopment agency created by the legislative 
body. 
3. "Public body" means the state, or any city, county, district, author-
ity, or any other subdivision or public body of the state. 
4. "State" includes any state agency or instrumentality. 
5. "Federal government" means the United States or any of its agencies 
or instrumentalities. 
6. "Legislative body" means the city commission, county commission, 
or other legislative body of the community or county. 
7. "Planning commission" means a planning commission established 
pursuant to law or charter. 
8. "Obligee" includes any bondholder, his trustee, any lessor demising 
to the agency property used in connection with a project area or any as-
signee of all or part of his interest, and the federal government when it is 
a party to any contract with the agency. 
9. "Redevelopment project" means any undertaking of an agency 
pursuant to this act. 
10. "Redevelopment" means the planning, development, replanning, re-
design, clearance, reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any combination of 
these, of all or part of a project area, and the provision of such residential, 
commercial, industrial, public, or other structures or spaces as may be 
appropriate or necessary in the interest of the general welfare, including 
recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant to them. Re-
development includes: 
(a) The alteration, improvement, modernization, reconstruction, or 
rehabilitation, or any combination of these, of existing structures in a 
project area; 
(b) Provision for open space types of use. such as streets and other 
public grounds and space around buildings, and public or private buildings, 
structures and improvements, and improvements of public or private recre-
ation areas and other public grounds; 
(c) The replanning or redesign or original development of unde-
veioped areas as to which either of the following conditions exist: 
(1) The'areas are stagnant or improperly utilized because of defective 
or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, shape, 
accessibility, or usefulness, or for other causes. 
(2) The areas require replanning and land assembly for reclamation or 
development in the interest of the general welfare because of widely scat-
tered ownership, tax delinquency, or other reasons. 
Redevelopment does not exclude the continuance of existing buildings 
or uses whose demolition and rebuilding or change of use are not deemed 
essential to the redevelopment and rehabilitation of the area. 
1M5-2. Definitions 
11. A "blighted area" is characterized by the existence of buildings 
and structures, used or intended to be used for living, commercial, indus-
trial, or other purposes, or any combination of such uses, which are unfit or 
unsafe to occupy for such purposes and are conducive to ill health, trans* 
mission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and cnme be-
cause of any one or a combination of the following factors. 
(a) Defective design and character of physical construction, 
(b) Faulty interior arrangement and exterior spacing, 
(c) High density of population and overcrowding, 
(d) Inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open spaces, 
and recreation facilities, 
(e) Age, obsolescence, detenoration, dilapidation, mixed character, or 
shifting of uses, 
(f) Economic dislocation, detenoration, or disuse, resulting from faulty 
planning, 
(g) Subdividing and sale of lots of irregular form and shape and in 
adequate size for proper usefulness and development, 
(h) Laying out of lots in disregard of the contours and other physical 
characteristics of the ground and surrounding conditions, 
(i) Existence of inadequate streets, open space and utilities, and 
(j) Existence of lots or other areas which are subject to being sub-
merged by water. 
History: L. IMS, d t 13, §2. 
11-15-3. Legislative intent.—In recognition of the historic public policy 
of this state that the providing, or construction of, and ownership of homes 
and housing are fundamentally and basically matters for private initiative 
and enterprise, which policy is hereby reaffirmed, it is declared to be the 
legislative intent that no provision of this act shall be deemed to permit 
or authorize public housing; that the purpose of this act is to authorize 
the redevelopment of slum and blighted areas by a combination of public 
effort and private enterprise, public effort to be by the exercise of the powers 
herein by this act granted, and, consistent with the sound needs of the 
community as a whole, the rehabilitation or redevelopment of the area 
by private enterprise; and that the permanent ownership of housing by 
public bodies is not contemplated nor authorized. The provisions of this 
act, however, shall not be construed or interpreted as prohibiting the 
temporary management of acquired slum or blighted properties for a rea-
sonable time by a legislative body or redevelopment agency pending the 
demolition or disposition of such properties in the manner by this act pro-
vided. 
11-1545. OoTtrnmental functions of agency. — Each redevelopment 
agency exercises governmental functions and has the powers prescribed in 
this act 
History: L. IMS, cfa. 13, §15. 
11-15-16. Public functions of agency.—Each agency is performing a 
public function of the community. 
History: L. 1905, ciL 13, 116. 
63-30-1. Short title—This act «hall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 
tt-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. Except as may be oth-
erwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmontally-owncd hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construc-
tion, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those activities. 
63-304. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other structures.—Im-
munity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or defective 
public building, structure, or other public improvement—Exception.—Im-
munity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective conditions. 
$3-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omis-
!ioa of employee — Exceptions — Waiver for injury caused by violation of 
fourth amendment rights. (1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
j9 waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of [hie] employment except if the injury: 
(*) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interfer-
ence with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the fail-
ure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
<e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
if) arises out of a misrepresentation by [said] the employee whether or not 
[seefe] it is negiigentor intentional; or 
(g) "arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstra-
tions, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county, 
or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any activity 
authorized by the State Land Boards j; or 
(H arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assistance, fight-
ing fire. handllngTiazardous materials, or emergency evacuations. 
(2)Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights 
u provided in Chapter 16, (efl Title 78 which shall be the exclusive remedy for 
injuries to those protected rights. If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or 
any pans thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be 
void and governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
